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I. STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
J & M Cattle Company, LLC, (hereinafter "J & M") concurs with the Statement of the

Case set forth in the Appellant's Brief filed by Farmers National Bank, (hereinafter "Farmers")
including Farmers' description of the Nature of the Case, the Course of the Proceedings, and the
Statement of Facts.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
J & M concurs with the Issue Presented On Appeal as stated by Appellant.

III. ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
J & M does not request an award of attorneys fees on appeal.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

J & M and Farmers Agree That The Proper Analysis Begins With The General
Rule That J & M's Possessory Lien Has Priority.
On February 13, 2013, Judge Stoker entered his Memorandum Opinion Re: Summary

Judgment holding that J & M's possessory lien (also sometimes referred to as an "agister's lien")
has priority over the prior perfected security interest of Farmers. (R. pp. 92-104). While Farmers
disputes Judge Stoker's conclusion, both Farmers and J & M agree with Judge Stoker's analysis
that frames the issue on appeal.
Judge Stoker began his analysis by stating what was not in dispute including the
stipulated facts and legal propositions upon which the parties agree. (R. pp. 94-96). Farmers

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 1

states an analysis in its memorandum that agrees with Judge Stoker and the position taken by
J & M in this case. (Appellant's Brief, pages 6-8.) Without belaboring the issues with yet a third
concurring analysis, J & M will simply list the matters that are not in dispute. J & M believes
that these undisputed facts and points of law alone, require that Judge Stoker's decision be
affirmed.
1.

J & M has a valid and enforceable agister's lien on the cattle proceeds pursuant

to I.C. § 4S-80S(b). (Appellant's Brief, page 6.)

I.e.

§ 4S-80S(b) is a possessory lien. (Appellant's Brief,

2.

J & M's lien under

3.

Farmers National Bank has a valid and enforceable prior perfected security

page 6.)

interest in the cattle proceeds. (Appellant's Brief, page 3.)
4.

J & M's lien and Farmers' security interest each exceed the amount of the cattle

proceeds. (Appellant's Brief, page 5.)
S.

Idaho Code § 28-9-333(b) applies to the determination of priority between

Farmers security interest and J & M's agister'S lien. (Appellant's Brief, page 6.)
6.

The general rule stated in I.C. § 28-9-333(b) is that J & M's agister's lien has

priority over the prior perfected security interest of Farmers unless I.C. § 4S-80S "expressly
provides otherwise." (Appellant's Brief, page 6.)
Judge Stoker's decision focused on whether I.C. § 4S-80S fell within the exception to the
general rule created by

I.e. § 28-9-333(b) and correctly held that it did not "expressly provide

otherwise" within the meaning ofI.C. § 28-9-333(b). (R. p. 101.)
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B.

Judge Stoker Correctly Applied The Phrase "Expressly Provides Otherwise."

Judge Stoker applied the same rules for statutory interpretation presented by Farmers in
its appellate brief. He began his analysis by examining the literal words of both

I.e.

§ 28-9-

333(b) and I.e. § 45-805. (R. pp. 95-98.) He gave the language of each statute its plain, obvious,
and rational meaning. Judge Stoker understood that the key to analyzing

I.e.

§ 45-805 was to

define the phrase "expressly provides otherwise." (R. p. 97.) Farmers leaps over this critical
analysis because the definition of "express" is fatal to its argument.
In the case of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho
479, 488, 224 P.3d 1068, 1077 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon Black's Law
Dictionary for the definition of the word "express" when discussing the meaning and
significance of that word. Judge Stoker did the same.
We have defined the word "express" as follows: "Black's Law
Dictionary defines 'express' as '[c]lear; definite; explicit; plain;
direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous. Declared in
terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made
known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Express
means 'manifested by direct and appropriate language."
148 Idaho at 488.
The use of the word "express" or "expressly" in I.C. § 28-9-333(b) makes it clear that the
Idaho Legislature intended that no statute create an exception to the rule of possessory lien
priority unless created by a clear and direct statement. No further analysis is required than to
apply that definition to the plain and ordinary language of I.C. § 45-805. Nowhere does the
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language in I.C. § 45-805 expressly provide that a prior perfected security interest takes priority
over a possessory agister's lien created by I.C. § 45-805(b).
The edition of I.C. § 45-805 applicable to the case at hand is set forth below. The statute
was amended effective July 1,2012, and July 1,2013, however those amendments do not affect
the analysis of the issue presented on this appeal.
For the convenience of the Court, I.C. § 45-805 is set forth in full as follows:
45-805. LIENS FOR SERVICES ON OR CARING FOR PROPERTY. (a)
Every person who, while lawfully in possession of an article of personal
property, renders any service to the owner thereof, by labor, or skill, employed
for the protection, improvement, safekeeping, or carriage thereof, has a special
lien thereon, dependent on possession, for the compensation, if any, which is
due him from the owner, for such service. If the liens as herein provided are
not paid within sixty (60) days after the work is done, service rendered or
materials supplied, the person in whose favor such special lien is created may
proceed to sell the property at a public auction after giving ten (10) days'
public notice of the sale by advertising in some newspaper published in the
county where the property is situated, or if there is no newspaper published in
the county then by posting notices of the sale in three (3) of the most public
places in the county for ten (10) days previous to such sale. The person shall
also send the notice of auction to the owner or owners of the property and to
the holder or holders of a perfected security interest in the property as
provided in subsection (c) of this section. The person who is about to render
any service to the owner of an article of personal property by labor or skill
employed for the protection, improvement, safekeeping or carriage thereof
may take priority over a prior perfected security interest by, before
commencing any such service, giving notice of the intention to render such
service to any holder of a prior perfected security interest at least three (3)
days before rendering such service. If the holder of the security interest does
not notify said person, within three (3) days that it does not consent to the
performance of such services, then the person rendering such service may
proceed and the lien provided for herein shall attach to the property as a
superior lien. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a motor vehicle
subject to the provisions of sections 49-1809 through 49-1818, Idaho Code.
(b) Livery or boarding or feed stable proprietors, and persons pasturing
livestock of any kind, have a lien, dependent on possession, for their

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 4

compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding or pasturing such livestock. If
the liens as herein provided are not paid within sixty (60) days after the work
is done, service rendered, or feed or pasturing supplied, the person in whose
favor such special lien is created may proceed to sell the property at a licensed
public livestock auction market, or if the lien is on equines, to sell the animals
at a sale offered to the public, after giving ten (l0) days' notice to the owner or
owners of the livestock and the state brand inspector. The information
contained in such notice shall be verified and contain the following:
(l) The time, place and date of the licensed public livestock auction
market, or in the case of equines, the time, place and date of the sale offered to
the public;
(2) The name, address and phone number of the person claiming the lien;
(3) The name, address and phone number of the owner or owners of the
livestock upon which the lien has been placed;
(4) The number, breed and current brand of the livestock upon which the
lien has been placed; and
(5) A statement by the lienor that the requirements of this section have
been met.
(c) Notices provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be
made by personal service or by certified or registered mail to the last known
address of the owner or owners and any holder of a prior perfected security
interest. The proceeds of the sale must be applied to the discharge of any prior
perfected security interest, the lien created by this section and costs; the
remainder, if any, must be paid over to the owner.
Idaho Code § 45-805 is divided into two subsections which address the "service of and
caring for" of two different categories of goods. Subsection (a) ofldaho Code § 45-805 creates a
lien for persons who render service to the owner of an article of personal property by labor, or
skill, for the protection, improvement, safekeeping, or carriage thereof. Subsection (b), on the
other hand, creates a lien for livery or boarding or feed stable proprietors, and persons pasturing

livestock of any kind for their compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding or pasturing such
livestock. This type of lien is often referred to as an "agister's lien" because the index to the
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Idaho Code has an entry under "Agisters Liens" which references Idaho Code § 45-805. West's
Idaho Code Annotated General Index, Thomson Reuters, Page 51 (2012).
Idaho Code § 45-805(b) creates J & M's agister's lien for the care of animals. Nowhere
in I.C. § 45-805(b) is there a reference of any kind to prior perfected security interests. I.C. § 45805(b) is completely consistent with the general rule under I.C. § 28-9-333(b) that the possessory
agister's lien has priority.
The parties to this action presented Judge Stoker with a pitched battle over the correct
interpretation of I.C. § 45-805(c) and Judge Stoker obliged the parties by addressing the
competing arguments. But when the definition of "express" is applied in evaluating I.C. § 45805(c), the correct conclusion is that the language in that subsection does not rise to the level of
an express statement of an exception to the priority of a possessory agister's lien. The fact that
I.e. § 45-805( c) supports such vigorous debate over what the legislature meant is illustrative of
the fact that subsection (c) fails to create an exception under I.e. § 28-9-333(b).

e.

Farmers' Interpretation of I.e. § 4S-80S(c) Relies Upon An Inference And Not The
Meaning Of The Words In The Statute.
It is Farmers argument that the language of I.C. § 45-805(c) creates a priority for

perfected security interests due to the order in which the interests of the competing parties are set
forth in the statute. However, Farmers ignores that its argument is based upon an inference and
not an express statement. (Appellant's Brief, pages 9, 10.) Noticeably absent from I.C. § 45805(c) is any numerical sequence, ranking, or a head-to-head comparison of the competing
interests that would be necessary to rise to the level of an express statement. The word "priority"
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is not used and the statute does not call out each competing interest and state which prevails over
the other. Instead, the interests are listed in one continuous sentence. Farmers asks this Court to
infer from that sentence that priority was intended. As Judge Stoker pointed out, a court would
have to ignore the plain definition of "express" as set forth in I.e. § 28-9-333(b) in order to rule
in Farmers' favor. (R. p. 101.)
In the case of Curry Grain Storage, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 120 Idaho 328, 815 P.2 1068
(1991), this Court reviewed a warehouseman's lien statute to determine if it created an exception
by satisfying the requirement of "expressly provides otherwise" under Idaho Code § 28-9-310
(the predecessor to I.C. § 28-9-333(b)). The Court held that the warehouseman's lien statute,
I.C. § 28-7-209(3)(a) did expressly provide otherwise. 120 Idaho at 330, 331. The relevant part
ofI.C. § 28-7-209(3)(a) cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in that decision is as follows:
(3)(a) A warehouseman's lien for charges and expenses under subsection (1)
... is also effective against any person who so entrusted the bailor with
possession of the goods that a pledge of them by [the bailor] to a good faith
purchaser for value would have been valid but is not effective against a person
as to whom the document confers no right in the goods covered by it under
section 28-7-503.

Curry Grain Storage, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 120 Idaho at 330, 331.
The Court held that the prior perfected security interest had priority over the
warehouseman's lien. The Court's decision was based on the fact that the language used in I.C.
§ 28-7-209(3)(a) directly compared a warehouseman's lien to other persons claiming an interest
in the goods. The statute specifically states when a warehouseman's lien is and is not effective
against persons with competing claims. In other words, the warehouseman's lien statute tells the
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reader when the warehouseman's lien prevails and when it does not. That type of direction and
analysis is completely lacking from I.e. § 45-805(c). Subsection (c) is completely passive and
devoid of any head-to-head comparison of competing interests.
To agree with Farmers' interpretation, the reader of I.C. § 45-805(c) must draw a
conclusion that is not stated in the language or text of the statute. Further analysis is unnecessary
to affirm Judge Stoker's Decision. Idaho Code § 45-805(c) contains no expression of priority
and Farmers' argument requires that priority be inferred in direct conflict with the requirement of
I.C. § 28-9-333(b).
Farmers argues that unless subsection (c) is interpreted as a determination of priority
between prior perfected security interests and agister's liens, the competing claims are left in a
tie and an "absurd result" is created. (Appellant's Brief, page 18.) This is the same argument by
Farmers that the Court should infer priority when none is expressed. Actually, subsection (c) is
only in harmony with subsections (a) and (b) if subsection (c) is interpreted as not expressing an
order of priority between prior perfected security interests and the possessory liens.
The correct interpretation of the express terms, without relying upon inference, is that
subsection (c) states who is to be paid ahead of the owner of the encumbered property. The only
phrase in subsection (c) which expresses a preference is the phrase "remainder" when referring
to the owner. As discussed infra, prior to the amendment of the statute in 1990, subsection (c)
made no reference to prior perfected security interests. The amendment simply added prior
perfected security interests as a claim that would be paid before any "remainder" is available to
an owner of the encumbered property. With subsection (c) neutral as to priority between prior
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perfected security interests and competing possessory liens, a determination of priority is made
by referring to subsection (a) for personal property liens that are not agister's liens, and
subsection (b) for agister's liens. Those statutes, together with I.C. § 28-9-333(b) supply the
answer as to priority because subsection (c) contains no express statement.
D.

A Review Of Other Idaho Statutes Shows That The Idaho Legislature Knows How
To Expressly State Priority When It Intends To Do So.

When the Idaho Legislature wants to grant one lien priority over another, it does not
merely list the liens without specific guidance. As shown by Idaho Code § 45-805(a) and many
other statutes, the Legislature will identify each lien and make a determination using the words
"prior" or "priority." One example is the statute creating a mechanic's or garageman's lien for
the repair of motor vehicles. That statute states:
Any person, firm or corporation, who makes, alters or repairs any article of
personal property, at the request of the owner or person in legal possession
thereof, has a lien, which said lien shall be superior and prior to any security
interest in the same for his reasonable charges for work done and materials
furnished, and may retain possession of the same until the charges are paid.
I.e. § 45-806 (emphasis added). The statute goes on to provide a notice mechanism whereby the
lienholder can "derive the benefits of this section" and retain his superior lien. This statute makes
an express statement regarding the priority of the possessory lienholder vis-a-vis the holder of a
security interest.
Another example is found in the statutes creating liens upon saw logs and lumber made
from saw logs (loggers' liens), I.C. §§ 45-401 and 45-402, respectively. Those liens are made
prior to any other liens by the following statutory language:
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The liens provided for in this chapter are prior to any other liens, and no sale
or transfer of any saw logs, spars, piles, cord wood or other timber or
manufactured lumber shall divest the lien thereon as herein provided, and such
lien shall follow such property into any county in this state into which the
same may be removed: provided, notice of such lien shall have been filed in
such county.

I.e. § 45-404 (emphasis added). Again, the Legislature here makes clear its intent to favor
loggers' liens over other interests, leaving nothing to inference or implication.
Yet another instance where the Idaho Legislature expressly grants priority is with regard
to a farm laborer's lien. The statute creating that lien provides:
Farm laborer's lien. (l) Any person who performs farm labor on a farm in
furtherance of production of a crop shall have a lien in the crop for the agreed
or reasonable value of the labor. (2) The farm laborer's lien shall have
priority over any security interest in the same crop. (3) A landlord's interest
in a crop produced on premises which are leased in consideration of a share of
the crop is not subject to a farm laborer's lien.

I.c. § 45-303 (emphasis added). Another example of this clarity on priority is the seed lien
statute, which provides:
Seed lien. (l) Any person who furnishes seed to a producer to be sown or
planted on lands owned, rented or otherwise lawfully occupied by the
producer, shall have a lien in the crop or crops produced from the seed for the
purchase price of the seed.
(2) The seed lien shall have priority over any security interest in the same
crop, but shall be subordinate to a farm laborer's lien in the same crop.
(3) A landlord's interest in a crop produced on premises which are leased
consideration of a share of the crop is not subject to a seed lien.

III

I.c. § 45-304 (emphasis added).
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What all these lien statutes show is that the Idaho Legislature knows how to draft statutes
that make express statements on lien priority. The language employed in these statutes is direct
and focused: "[S]aid lien shall be superior and prior to any security interest," I.C. § 45-806;
"The liens provided for in this chapter are prior to any other liens," I.e. § 45-404; "The farm
laborer's lien shall have priority over any security interest in the same crop," I.C. § 45-303;
"The seed lien shall have priority over any security interest in the same crop," I.C. § 45-304.
This type of clear drafting is noticeably missing from I.C. § 45-805(b) or (c). Farmers asks the
Court to rewrite the statute and engraft language that is absent, a result that would be particularly
inappropriate where the missing language is language the Legislature commonly employs in
similar statutes when it wants to speak to lien priority. The fact that such language is not present
in I.C. § 45-805(b) or (c) reflects a choice on the part of the Legislature that should be honored
by this Court.
E.

Farmers' Reliance On A Comparison To Idaho Code § 45-1507 Is Misplaced.

Farmers argues that a comparison of I. e. § 45-1507 to I. e. § 45-805( c) demonstrates that
I.e. § 45-805(c) was intended to establish a priority. The comparison fails and actually supports
J & M's position. Completely absent from I.e. § 45-805(c) is the structure and numbering that is

found in I.C. § 45-1507. Absent from I.e. § 45-805(c) is any expression of preference or order,
any sequential numbering for the application of the sale proceeds, or structure that segregates
and identifies each independent level of sale proceeds application.

As demonstrated by a

comparison of I.e. § 45-805(c) to I.e. § 45-1507, had the Idaho Legislature intended to make an
express exception to the priority of an agister's lien under I.e. § 28-9-333(b), the Idaho
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Legislature could have done so by following the format used in I.e. § 45-1507. Since I.e. § 451507 is an example of an express statutory statement of priority, then I.e. § 45-805(c) is not.

F.

Judge Stoker's Decision That I.e. § 45-805(c) Is Ambiguous Means That The
Statute Does Not Contain An Express Exception To J & M's Possessory Lien
Priority.
Judge Stoker analyzed the language used in each section of I.e. § 45-805 to conclude that

subsection (c) had at least three viable interpretations and therefore was ambiguous. (R. pp. 99.)
As recognized by this court in the case of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI

Associates, LLP, supra., the word "express" is defined as "not dubious or ambiguous." 48 Idaho
at 488. Judge Stoker's decision is fatal to Farmers position because an ambiguous subsection (c)
is not an "expressly stated" exception to the rule that J & M's possessory agister's lien has
priority. (R. pp. 99, 100.)
Instead of stopping at that point, Judge Stoker proceeded with an analysis of the statute
employing well-established principals of statutory construction to ascertain the intentions of the
Idaho Legislature. (R. pp. 99-100.)

G.

Engaging In Statutory Construction Does Not Create An Express Grant Of Priority
In Idaho Code § 45-805 (c).
The objective in interpreting and construing a statute is to derive the intent of the

legislative body that adopted it. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192,
196,46 P.3d 9,13 (2002). That analysis begins with the literal language of the statute. Id. Where
the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect and there is no occasion for a court to construe the language. Id. If the language of the
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statute is ambiguous, then this Court is required to follow the rules of construction when
interpreting and construing the statute. ld.
All sections of Idaho Code § 45-805 must be construed together so as to determine the
legislature's intent and the language of a particular section should not be viewed in a vacuum. ld.
No part of I.e. § 45-805 should be rendered superfluous or insignificant. ld. This Court may
also consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations because constructions that would
lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. ld.
Subsection (c) of I.C. § 45-805 must be construed together with subsection (a). It is
undisputed that I.e. § 45-805(b) does not, expressly or otherwise, create an exception to the
priority of a lien created under that subsection.

However, I.e. § 45-805(a) does expressly

address the priority of a lien created under that subsection. Idaho Code § 45-805(a) provides a
notification procedure by which a person who is about to render a service to an owner of an
article of personal property may take priority over a prior perfected security interest.

If the

following language from I.C. § 45-805(c), "the proceeds of the sale must be applied to the
discharge of any prior perfected security interest, the lien created by this section and costs," is
determined to establish priority based on its sequence, such a determination would lead to an
unreasonable result. Such a determination would negate the express notice procedure available
to provide priority for a lien created pursuant to I.C. § 45-805(a). It would be unreasonable to
have the same language mean one thing with regard to subsection (a) and have an opposite
meaning with regard to subsection (b).
When I.C. § 45-805 was amended in 1990, then I.C. § 28-9-310 provided:
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When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or
materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods
in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such
materials or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the
lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Idaho Code § 28-9-310 (Westlaw 1990). Prior to the 1990 amendment ofI.C. § 4S-80S, I.e. §
28-9-310 provided the rule that a lien created pursuant to I.C. § 4S-80S took priority over a prior
perfected security interest. ld. Idaho Code § 28-9-333 is now in effect and provides the same
rule.
Statutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature knew of all other statutes
in existence at the time the statues were passed. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep. Highway
Dist., 126 Idaho 14S, ISO, 879 P .2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Accordingly, the Court should consider
that the Idaho Legislature was aware that the creation of an express rule of priority contrary to
then I.C. § 28-9-310 was required to change how the priority of I.C. § 4S-805(b) liens would be
determined. There is also no question that the Legislature created an express rule of priority
contrary to then I.C. § 28-9-310 with regard to I.e. § 4S-80S(a).

Prior to amendment in 1990,

Idaho Code § 4S-80S(a) simply stated:
4S-80S. LIENS FOR SERVICES ON OR CARING FOR PROPERTY.

(a) Every person who, while lawfully in possession of an article of personal
property, renders any service to the owner thereof, by labor, or skill, employed
for the protection, improvement, safe keeping, or carriage thereof, has a special
lien thereon, dependent on possession, for the compensation, if any, which is
due him from the owner, for such service.
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A comparison of I.C. § 45-805(a) before and after the 1990 amendments leaves no
question that the Legislature was addressing the issue of priority between a prior perfected
security interest and the lien created under subsection (a). The Legislature made no change to
I.C. § 45-805(b) and the changes made to I.C. § 45-805(c) make no express reference to priority.
This is significant because the Legislature knew that it was required to create an express rule of
priority contrary to I.C. § 28-9-310 as it did with I.e. § 45-805(a) in order to alter the priority of
a lien created pursuant to I.C. § 45-805(b). The amendments to I.C. § 45-805(c) did not leave
the meaning of subsection (c) unchanged. Idaho Code § 45-805( c) was amended as follows by
addition of the underlined language:
(c) Notices provided in Subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be made
by personal service or by certified or registered mail to the last known address
of the owner or owners and any holder of a prior perfected security interest.
The proceeds of the sale must be applied to the discharge of any prior
perfected security interest, the lien created by this section and costs; the
remainder, if any, must be paid over to the owner.
Idaho Code § 45-805(c).
The second sentence of subsection (c) was amended to provide that proceeds of the sale
must be paid to the holder of a prior perfected security interest before any proceeds of the sale
are paid to the owner. This amendment is a material and significant change with regard to the
owner. Prior to the amendment, what remained of the sale proceeds after the lien and costs were
discharged were paid to the owner and a secured creditor was forced to seek collection from the
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owner. Now the secured creditor is paid directly from the proceeds of the sale. The amendment
altered what parties were paid from the proceeds of the sale before the owner is paid but does not
expressly or otherwise address the priority or order in which the secured creditor, the lienholder,
or the costs of the sale are to be paid. Priority between the secured creditor and lienholder is
determined by I.C. § 28-9-333(b), the expressed exception under I.C. § 45-805(a) for liens under
that statute, and I.C. § 45-805(b) for J & M's agister's lien. All subsection (c) does is solidify
the right of a prior perfected security interest to be paid before a "remainder" is determined and
is paid over to the owner.

Subsection (c) simply states that certain parties and costs are paid

from the proceeds of a sale before the owner receives payment, nothing more.
Farmers argues that subsection (c) satisfies the requirement ofIdaho Code § 28-9-333 as
an expression of priority by simply not being silent on the issue. (Appellant's Brief page 12.)
Farmers quotes to the comment section of the UCC in reference to Idaho Code § 28-9-333. The
comment does not undercut or dilute the requirement for an express statement of an exception
within the text of Idaho Code § 28-9-333(b). The comment only addresses the circumstance
where a statute is silent. The comment states that if a statute is silent "as to its priority relative to
a security interest, this section provides a rule of interpretation that the possessory lien takes
priority. .. ."

The fact is, the language of subsection (c) is "silent" on the issue of priority

between a possessory lien and a prior perfected security interest, there being no words or phrases
addressing the issue of priority. Consistent with I.C. § 28-9-333(b) and the comment section,
subsection (c) is not an expression of priority.
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While liens created under subsection (a) are expressly made subordinate to pnor
perfected security interests in the articles of personal property unless notice is given to the
security holder, liens created under subsection (b) are not similarly subordinated. Notably absent
from subsection (b) is analogous subordination language. Farmers argues that the absence of
similar language in subsection (b) means that the Legislature intended possessory agister's liens
to always be subordinate to prior perfected security interests. (Appellant's Brief, page 15.) Of
course, that argument requires that I.C. § 28-9-333(b) be ignored and that I.e. § 45-805(c) be
elevated to an express statement of priority, when actually I.e. § 28-9-333(b) is controlling and
I.C. § 45-805(c) does not contain language stating that a prior perfected security interest has
priority.
If the Legislature had intended to subordinate possessory liens upon livestock created
under I.e. § 45-805(b), it would have expressly so stated as it did for those liens created under
subsection (a). It is a well-established principal of statutory construction that when, as in the
case of Idaho Code § 45-805, legislative authority "includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act; it is generally presumed that [the
legislative authority] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.E.2d 17 (1983); Singh v. Holder,

591 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010); In Re RUche, 254 B.R. 913, 919 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000).
See also In Re Pacific Atlantic Trading Co., 33 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that had

Congress wanted to draw a distinction between late and timely priority claims in subsection
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(a)(1) it would have expressly made such distinction as it had done in subsections (a)(2) and
(a)(3)).
The differing language of subsections (a) and (b) of Idaho Code § 45-805 must be
presumed intentional and given their disparate meaning. Had the Idaho Legislators intended to
subordinate a possessory lien such as J & M's created under subsection (b), it would have
expressly so provided as it did for possessory liens created under the immediately preceding
subsection (a). Due to the absence of any express subordination language in the statute which
created J & M's possessory lien, Idaho Code § 45-805(b), J & M's lien is given priority over
Farmers' prior perfected security interest in the Cattle pursuant to the UCC's priority rules in
Idaho Code § 28-9-333.
Farmers points to the title of the Act in the 1990 Idaho Session Laws as support for the
conclusion that the Legislature must have intended subsection (c) to address the issue of priority
between an agister's lien and a prior perfected security interest. (Appellant's Brief pages 14, 15.)
The phrase that Farmers relies upon states that the amendment is "TO PROVIDE PRIORITY
STATUS, AND TO PROVIDE EXCEPTIONS." (Appellant's Brief page 14.) The title does not
support Farmers' argument. The phrase that Farmers relies upon refers to all of the amendments
to I.C. § 45-805 that took place in 1990, including the amendments to subsection (a). As stated
above, the amendments to subsection (a) expressly provide for the priority status of a prior
perfected security interest and then expressly provides for an exception whereby the possessory
lienholder can achieve a superior position through the notice procedure in subsection (a).
Specific to subsection (c), the amendments added the reference to prior perfected security
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interest to make it clear that prior perfected security interests, along with the possessory lien, fall
into the group of obligations to be paid before the "remainder" is available to the owner of the
property.
The logical conclusion is that the reference in the title is to the amendment to subsection
(a).

Given the statement of purpose in the Idaho Session Laws and the amendments to

subsection (a), the absence of clear and direct language making a head-to-head comparison of
prior perfected security interests to subsection (b) agister's liens shows that the Legislature did
not intend to elevate a prior perfected security interest to a position of priority.
Farmers also argues that the interpretation of subsection (a) is dependent upon subsection
(c) by stating that subsection (a) "only presupposes" that a prior perfected security interest has
priority over the possessory lien created by that subsection. (Appellant's Brief, pages 16, 17.)
Farmers ignores all the shortcomings of subsection (c) to argue that it must be the source of prior
perfected security interest priority since subsection (a) only supposes that priority and doesn't
state it. (Appellant's Brief, page 16.) This "presumption" argument by Farmers is a fiction.
Subsection (a) concisely provides that with regard to the lien under that statute, it is subordinate
to a prior perfected security interest unless the notice procedure provides otherwise.
The analysis required by subsection (a) begins with the prior perfected security interest
having priority because it is the only secured interest in existence. For the holder of a potential
possessory lien to establish priority, they must perform the notice procedures "before
commencing any such service." Until the holder of the possessory lien performs the notice
procedures and renders a service, there is no possessory lien in competition with a prior perfected
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security interest. The language in subsection (c) has nothing to do with the analysis under
subsection (a).
Subsection (a) explicitly states how to determine priority between the prior perfected
security interest and the possessory lien created under that statute. This is the type of head-tohead comparison of competing interests that provides a clear and express statement of priority.
The Legislature can, and did simply state in subsection (a) that the analysis starts with the
priority of a prior perfected security interest with regard to this specific type of lien. Given the
absence of any language in subsection (c) providing any express comparison of priority between
liens and security interests, there is no basis to conclude that the source of prior perfected
security interest priority in subsection (a) is based upon subsection (c).

Again, Farmers'

argument undercuts its own position. If the Legislature was intending to link subsection (c) to
the rest of the statute as an expression of priority, and found it necessary to specifically reference
prior perfected security interests in subsection (a), it would only make sense that the Legislature
would have specifically referenced prior perfected security interests under subsection (b).

H.

The Power to Liquidate Collateral Under I.C. § 4S-80S(b) Correctly Belongs To The
Party With Priority.
Farmers' analysis ignores the language in Idaho Code § 45-805(b) which provides the

holder of the possessory agister's lien with the absolute right to unilaterally liquidate the herd of
cattle. It would be illogical for the Idaho Legislature to intend that a prior perfected security
interest have priority over an agister's lien as argued by Farmers, yet provide the holder of a
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prIor perfected security interest with no rights whatsoever to control the disposition of the
collateral.
Under subsection (b), the holder of the agister's lien is burdened with caring for the
animals sixty (60) days without payment, providing notice, and selling the animals at a public
livestock auction market. It would be illogical to burden the holder of the possessory agister's
lien with the expense of complying with the procedure in the statute unless the agister's lien had
priority. Under Farmers' interpretation of I.e. § 45-805, the party caring for the cattle/collateral
is trapped. They must either continue to feed and care for the animals without payment, all to the
benefit of the prior perfected security interest, or incur the expense of complying with the statute
for liquidation of the collateral, again solely to the benefit of the prior perfected security interest.
It is important to note that under Farmers' interpretation of subsection (c), as a statement

of priority, the prior perfected security interest would be paid ahead of the agister's lien and also
ahead of "costs."

The rules for statutory construction allow this Court to consider the

reasonableness of the proposed interpretations with unreasonable or harsh results disfavored.

Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho at 196. That the Idaho Legislature did
not intend a prior perfected security interest to have priority over the agister's lien is evident
from the absolute right to liquidate collateral granted the agister's lienholder and the relegation
of the prior perfected security interest holder to merely a party entitled to notice of sale. An
interpretation of the statute that the prior perfected security interest holder has priority would
leave the agister's lienholder with power over the collateral yet without any benefit from
exercising those powers. At the same time, the holder of the prior perfected security interests
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would want to have the power to liquidate the collateral, but would have no power to do so under
the statute.
I.

Idaho Code § 4S-80S(b) Shows That The Idaho Legislature Intended Special
Protection For An Agister's Lienholder Who Is Feeding And Caring For Livestock.
The statute assures the continuation of humane care for the livestock during a time that

the owner of the livestock is not meeting its obligations, because the provider of the feed and
care knows that it will recover the cost of the continuing care when the animals are sold. The
financial burden of caring for the livestock collateral falls on the lienholder who is feeding and
caring for the livestock because it is the party in the best position to care for the animals and the
possessory nature of the lien requires that they keep the cattle until the cattle are sold as provided
for in subsection (b). If the possessory lien of the party feeding and caring for the cattle did not
have priority, there would be no incentive to care for the owner's cattle purely for the benefit of a
lender with a prior perfected security interest. It would be illogical to grant the party caring for
the cattle a possessory lien that necessarily requires the ongoing expense of animal care and then
subjugate the right to payment for the benefit of a secured lender.
The result advocated by J & M is also fair to a prior perfected security interest holder
such as Farmers. By continuing the care and feeding of the livestock, the holder of the agister's
lien maintains the value of the collateral for all secured parties since weight loss, illness, or death
of the animals due to lack of care would be commercially unacceptable. Further, the holder of a
prior perfected security interest can protect itself through contractual arrangements with its
customer (the owner of the livestock) and the person providing the care and feed for the
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livestock. By monitoring the owner's payment for the care and feed of the livestock, a prior
perfected security interest holder can act quickly to minimize or eliminate the agister's lien
through direct payment to the party providing feed and care to the herd. In practice, I.C. § 45805(b) merely requires a lender to pay for the essential care of its living collateral to prevent the
existence of a competing agister's lien. That lender can then realize the full benefit from the
collateral.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, J & M respectfully requests that the Final Judgment
of the District Court be affirmed.
DATED this~ day of September, 2013.
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP

~=

DA
. PENNY, ISB No. 3631
Attorneys for Respondent J & M Cattle Company, LLC

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

John S. Ritchie
COLEMAN, RITCHIE & CLUFF
P.O. Box 525
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0525
Attorneys for Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant
Served by: U.S. Mail

~~-=

DAVIDM.~

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 24

